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1. IRAQ CONST., available at http://trade.gov/static/iraq_newconstitution.pdf (translated
to English) (last visited Feb. 28, 2008); see also Edward Wong, Iraqi Vote Approves Draft
Constitution, Final Tally Divides on Sectarian Lines, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Oct. 26, 2005, at 1.
For details on the Constitution, see Zachary Elkins & Tom Ginsburg, Commentary on the
Draft Iraqi Constitution (2005) (unpublished manuscript), available at https://netfiles.uiuc.
edu/zelkins/constitutions/publications.htm.
2. See Coalition Provisional Authority, Homepage of the New Iraq, http://www.cpa-
iraq.org (no longer updated due to the dissolution of the CPA in June 2004) (last visited Feb.
28, 2008).
3. See Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Jim Rutenberg, A Step Away from Maliki, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
22, 2007, at A1 (discussing President George W. Bush’s frustration with the Iraqi
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INTRODUCTION
On October 15, 2005, Iraqis voted in overwhelming numbers to
adopt a new constitution.1 Although all hoped that the new docu-
ment would mark a political settlement, the new constitutional
structure has not been able to ameliorate, and may even have
exacerbated, a problem of instability and political disintegration. At
the very least, the constitution of Iraq—drafted under the Iraqi
Governing Council of the occupying Coalition Provisional Authority2
—has not produced a political reconstruction of the society.3
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government’s “failure” to unify its warring factions, as well as Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker’s
belief that political progress in Iraq has been “extremely disappointing”).
4. See Martin Fackler, New Premier Seeks a Japan with Muscle and a Voice, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 27, 2006, at A3.
5. See Norimitsu Onishi, Set To Lead, Japan’s Next Premier Reconsiders Postwar Era,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2006, at A12. Abe’s grandfather Nobosuke Kishi was implicated as a
Class A war criminal and later became Prime Minister. Id. His father, Shintaro Abe, was a
high-ranking leader within the ruling Liberal Democratic Party. James Sterngold, Shintaro
Abe, Japanese Politician and Ex-Cabinet Aide, Dies at 67, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 1991, at D23.
6. It will enjoy the longest period for a national constitution to survive without
amendment. The previous record of sixty-one years was held by the United States between
1804 and 1865. See Robert Knowles, The Balance of Forces and the Empire of Liberty: States’
Rights and the Louisiana Purchase, 88 IOWA L. REV. 343, 413 (2003).
7. See generally Frederick Schauer, On the Migration of Constitutional Ideas, 37 CONN.
L. REV. 907 (2005) (discussing imposed, transplanted, indigenous, and transnational
constitutions).
8. Noah Feldman, Imposed Constitutionalism, 37 CONN. L. REV. 857, 858-59 (2005); see
also POLITICAL CULTURE AND CONSTITUTIONALISM: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH 2-3 (Daniel P.
Franklin & Michael J. Baun eds., 1995) [hereinafter POLITICAL CULTURE AND CONSTITU-
TIONALISM] (distinguishing imperialistic from preparatory occupations). 
As Baghdad burned, several thousand miles away a nationalist
politician named Shinzo Abe prepared to assume the position of
Prime Minister of Japan.4 Abe’s platform rested largely on a more
aggressive foreign policy and a revision of the “Peace” Constitution
of 1947.5 Drafted largely by American occupying authorities in little
more than a week in 1946, that constitution has provided a stable
basis for Japan’s phenomenal economic growth and political
reconstruction as an industrial democracy. It has never been
amended and this year will become, by our reckoning, the most
stable written constitution in history.6
These two contrasting experiences prompt examination of the
phenomenon of occupation constitutions—constitutions drafted or
adopted in the extreme condition of one state having explicit
sovereign power over another.7 One may suppose that such constitu-
tions would reflect, if not reproduce in toto, the constitutional
tradition of the occupier, exemplifying what Professor Feldman calls
“imposed constitutionalism.”8 A closer look at the process, however,
suggests that even in cases of seemingly unilateral imposition,
such as Japan, domestic input or negotiation may very well play a
nontrivial role. Indeed, the form of the Japanese constitution—
one that preserves a role for the emperor in a parliamentary
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9. See, e.g., Yasuhiro Okudaira, Forty Years of the Constitution and Its Various
Influences: Japanese, American, and European, in JAPANESE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2-3 (Percy
R. Luney, Jr. & Kazuyuki Takahashi eds., 1993).
10. See Ellen Knickmeyer & Jonathan Finor, Iraqis Submit Charter, but Delay Vote,
WASH. POST, Aug. 23, 2005, at A1 (describing the “major role” played by American officials in
the drafting process, including “typ[ing] up the draft and translat[ing] changes from English
to Arabic for Iraqi lawmakers”).
11. See, e.g., IRAQ CONST. art. 2 (describing the role of Islam as a constraint on
lawmaking).
12. See Zachary Elkins & Tom Ginsburg, Comparative Constitutions Project, https://
netfiles.uiuc.edu/zelkins/constitutions (last visited Feb. 22, 2008).
system9—suggests that MacArthur’s team was less interested in
exporting U.S. institutions per se than in adapting a set of workable
institutions, of whatever flavor, that fit local conditions. Similarly,
the Iraqi Constitution, although written with substantial assistance
by the U.S. government,10 departs in significant ways from basic
tenets of American constitutional belief.11 
These cases raise basic empirical questions. For one, how many
episodes of occupation result in a new constitution for the occupied
state? Second, to what degree do such documents reflect the political
principles and institutions of the occupying power? We are in a
unique position to answer these questions, having compiled a
dataset on both the constitutional chronology of states (i.e., dates of
constitutional change) and the content of constitutions.12 The
answers to these questions inform us about the degree of imposition
reflected in political reconstruction under occupations. They lead
inevitably, however, to other questions concerning the performance
and fate of occupation constitutions. When do such constitutions
accomplish their goals? When do they not? What elements of local
adaptation are necessary for institutions to work? Why do some
occupation constitutions endure while others fail? As a group, are
occupation constitutions at higher risk of replacement or revision
than other constitutions?
This Essay proceeds by defining the universe of occupations since
1816 and identifying the set of constitutions written under these
circumstances. Part II then analyzes the forty-two instances of
constitutions adopted under occupation or shortly thereafter. Part
III discusses the conditions under which occupation authorities seek
to use constitutions to facilitate political reconstruction, as opposed
to other methods. This Part next examines the content of these
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13. For a discussion of game theory, institutional dynamics, and self-enforcing patterns
of behavior, see AVNER GREIF, INSTITUTIONS AND THE PATH TO THE MODERN ECONOMY:
LESSONS FROM MEDIEVAL TRADE 10-11 (2006).
14. LEO TOLSTOY, ANNA KARENINA 17 (1877).
constitutions and evaluates their similarity to those of the occupying
power. Finally, it explores the determinants of “successful” (or at
least durable) occupation constitutions, and argues that a key factor
is that the constitution be self-enforcing in the game-theoretical
sense.13 The evidence suggests that self-enforcement is indeed a
crucial quality. 
The closing section returns to Tokyo and Baghdad. The Essay
examines those two cases in some depth, in part because there is
significant evidence that U.S. policymakers drew on the post-World
War II experience of political reconstruction in Germany and Japan
for inspiration in planning the post-Saddam Iraq, even though the
results could not have been more different. Japanese success and
Iraqi struggles, it turns out, cannot be ascribed to different motives
on the part of the occupiers. Rather, general findings from the broad
set of cases help one to understand the contrast between the two
case studies. A careful accounting of constitution making in Japan
marks it clearly as an exceptional case, but one with general lessons
for understanding constitutional stability.
I. THE PROBLEMS OF POLITICAL RECONSTRUCTION AND THE ROLE
OF CONSTITUTIONS
Every happy family, began Leo Tolstoy in Anna Karenina, is
happy in the same way, whereas every unhappy family is unhappy
in its own unique way.14 In the case of occupation constitutions, the
story often ends in one of many possible unhappy ways, but there
are a few success stories in which an occupation constitution leads
to the birth of a stable democratic polity. Although there may be
differences in form, the community of democratic nations shares
certain core characteristics, which are largely represented in written
constitutions. Thus, the happy story is already written but too
rarely realized.
To achieve this end, a constitutional scheme must deal with
certain universal problems of political reconstruction. First, the
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15. See, e.g., Ruti Teitel, Perspectives on Transnational Justice: Collective Memory,
Command Responsibility, and the Political Psychology of Leadership: The Law and Politics
of Contemporary Transnational Justice, 38 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 837 (2005) (describing the
process of trials, constitution drafting, and elections).
16. For a list and description of international truth and reconciliation commissions, see
U.S. Inst. of Peace, Truth Commissions Digital Collection, http://www.usip.org/library/
truth.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2008). Examples include Argentina, Nigeria, Sri Lanka, and
South Africa.
17. See, e.g., Barry Weingast, Self-enforcing Constitutions: With an Application to
Democratic Stability in America’s First Century 31-33 (Hoover Inst., Stanford Univ., Working
Paper, Nov. 2005), available at http://politicalscience.stanford.edu/faculty/documents/
weingast-self-enforcing%20constitutions.pdf (discussing the reconciliation of elites after the
U.S. Civil War).
18. See id.
19. See, e.g., Russell Hardin, Why a Constitution?, in THE FEDERALIST PAPERS AND THE
NEW INSTITUTIONALISM 100, 100-20 (Bernard Grofman & Donald Wittman eds., 1989); Barry
R. Weingast, Designing Constitutional Stability, in DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN AND
PUBLIC POLICY: ANALYSIS AND EVIDENCE 343, 343-66 (Roger D. Congleton & Birgitta
Swedenborg eds., 2006) [hereinafter Weingast, Designing Constitutional Stability]; Peter
Ordeshook, Constitutional Stability, 3 CONST. POL. ECON. 137 (1992); Barry R. Weingast, The
Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of Law, 91 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 245 (1997)
[hereinafter Weingast, Political Foundations].
crimes, or even philosophical differences, of the old regime must be
reconciled, either explicitly or implicitly, with the repudiating
approach of the new regime.15 These differences can be dealt with
through purges, criminal trials, truth and reconciliation commis-
sions,16 or simply ignored, depending on the relative power of the
remaining elite. Second, a corollary is that, unless totally defeated,
the remnants of the past must be brought into the political process.
There will always be some elements that were part of the state
during the ancien regime, even if they were not committed to a
particular leadership or governance structure.17 Even autocrats rule
with the implicit consent of many of the governed, if not always a
majority.18 What becomes important, then, is the question of how to
offer the passive supporters of the old regime a combination of
carrots and sticks to bring them into the fold and ensure that they
do not act as spoilers for the new regime. Third, there is a need to
ensure that the bargains that establish democracy endure over time.
To understand how constitutions can potentially resolve these
problems and create an enduring basis for political order, this Essay
follows recent work on self-enforcing constitutions.19 Any constitu-
tional agreement, whether in a dictatorship or democracy, involves
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20. See, e.g., Hardin, supra note 19, at 108-09.
21. Id. at 111.
22. See GREIF, supra note 13, at 384 (describing self-enforcing endogenous institutions in
which individuals and institutions follow the behavior expected of them, creating equilibria).
23. See Weingast, Designing Constitutional Stability, supra note 19, at 348-51.
24. Id. (describing how the rationality of citizens’ fear renders constitutions necessarily
delicate because of their broad implications).
25. See id. at 347; see also Weingast, Political Foundations, supra note 19, at 246.
26. See Weingast, Designing Constitutional Stability, supra note 19, at 349.
27. See Weingast, Political Foundations, supra note 19, at 251 (describing the difficulties
an agreement among powerful forces in the society.20 Unlike
ordinary contracts, however, constitutional agreements have no
external guarantor to enforce the terms, independent of the
parties.21 To endure, constitutions must be self-enforcing, meaning
they must give rise to an equilibrium from which no party has an
incentive to deviate.22 Even though constitutions may produce
relative winners and relative losers, they will endure to the extent
that the losers believe they are better off within the constitutional
bargain than in taking a chance on negotiating a new one.23
What happens when a party to the constitutional bargain seeks
to violate the terms of the agreement? One can conceive of violations
occurring either because winners seek to enhance their power
beyond the original bargain, or because relative losers seek to
overturn the bargain to negotiate or impose a better deal.24 When
such violations occur, the enforcement mechanism of constitutions
comes into play. 
Enforcement in democracies ultimately relies on citizens or at
least a broad group of elites.25 Any such group, however, faces
enormous collective action problems in enforcing the constitution.
That is, all citizens may be better off acting collectively to confront
government transgressions, but no individual citizen has the
incentive to take the risky step of doing so alone.26 If only some
citizens challenge the government, their efforts are likely to be in
vain. Given acquiescence on the part of others, the individual costs
of challenging the sovereign are exorbitant (often the price will
include loss of life or liberty). Moreover, because citizens have
heterogeneous preferences and imperfect information about others’
preferences, it may be the case in reality that they cannot coordi-
nate to agree on when a violation has occurred and what steps to
take.27 Political acquiescence is required for every constitutional
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of the citizen coordination that is required to police a sovereign).
28. See id.
29. See, e.g., John Carey, Parchment, Equilibria, and Institutions, 33 COMP. POL. STUD.
735, 749-51 (2000) (describing coordination and constitutional stability); David A. Strauss,
Common Law, Common Ground, and Jefferson’s Principle, 112 YALE L.J. 1717, 1733-36 (2003)
[hereinafter Strauss, Common Ground]; David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional
Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 910-11 (1996) (analogizing constitutional
conventionalism to “focal points” in game theory) [hereinafter Strauss, Common Law
Constitutional Interpretation].
30. See Strauss, Common Ground, supra note 29, at 1734.
31. See Weingast, Designing Constitutional Stability, supra note 19, at 344-46.
32. See id. at 344.
33. See id. at 345.
34. See Feldman, supra note 8, at 857-59 (describing recent examples of constitutions in
post-conflict states being drafted under conditions of de facto or de jure occupation).
violation to succeed and acquiescence is the expected outcome, given
the collective action problems citizens face.28 Accordingly, citizens
need to coordinate their behavior to ensure that enforcement is
effective.
Written constitutions can solve the collective action problem
among citizens by serving as a useful coordination device.29 They
allow actors to anticipate actions of others by providing focal points
—a common understanding of what constitutes a constitutional
violation—for enforcement.30 In turn, a widely held expectation of
strict enforcement can prevent parties from violating the bargain
in the first place, ensuring constitutional self-enforcement.31 This
framework helps us understand why effective constitutional
democracy is so rare in general: punishing transgressions by
political leaders is extremely difficult.32 It also helps us to under-
stand, however, why written constitutions are important compo-
nents of constitutional democracy: they provide focal points for
coordinating enforcement efforts.33
In order to play this role in helping citizens to coordinate,
constitutional provisions must be well known and widely respected.
Unfortunately, these attributes are unlikely to inhere in the
occupation constitution. The first criteria, that of well known rules,
is handicapped by the process of drafting. Although military
occupations may have various techniques of propaganda at their
disposal, the process of generating the constitutional scheme is
likely to be somewhat closed and rely heavily on the resources of the
occupiers and local elites.34 This makes it less likely that citizens
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35. See id. at 879-85 (describing external pressures and the tension between equality and
autonomy).
36. See, e.g., Kirsti Samuels,  Post-Conflict Peace-Building and Constitution-Making, 6
CHI. J. INT’L L. 663, 669 n.26 (2006) (noting that “the people have strongly rejected the
constitutions in Nigeria and Bahrain, which were not at all participatory,” because they were
imposed on the people rather than made by them).
37. See, e.g., Michael J. Frank, U.S. Military Courts and the War in Iraq, 39 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 645, 696 (2006) (noting that many Iraqis, and the judges tasked with
maintaining legal and constitutional order, “see [U.S.] soldiers primarily as foreign occupiers
who may justly be attacked by their fellow Iraqis even though their very lives depend on the
protection these ‘infidel occupiers’ provide”).
38. See Weingast, Designing Constitutional Stability, supra note 19, at 349.
will know about the details of the constitutional text through any
deliberative or participatory process.
The second criteria, wide respect for constitutional provisions,
relates to their relevance and legitimacy, both of which are ad-
versely affected by the occupation constitution’s foreign character.
Externally imposed provisions and institutions are less likely to
match citizens’ prior beliefs about rightful limits on government.35
Moreover, citizens may be less likely to embrace a new set of rules
that are noticeably imported, especially when there is an undercur-
rent of nationalism, as is common in post-war settings. The result
is a set of rules that may very well be unclear, illogical, and
unpalatable to a citizenry charged with defending them.36
Constitutions written at the behest of the occupier, then, are
unlikely to develop into self-enforcing bargains and as a result will
depend upon the occupier for their enforcement, at least in the short
run.37 Such external enforcement further discourages citizen action
in two ways. First, if citizens believe a foreign power will punish
transgressions, they will have little incentive to pay the costs
necessary to organize and challenge the ruling elite. Second, citizens
may become unaccustomed to challenging transgressions. Such
habits may result in relative ignorance of constitutional limits and
a general expectation that citizens are not responsible for monitor-
ing the ruling elite. Occupation constitutions are likely to create a
culture of acquiescence in which citizens are explicitly absolved of
any responsibility for enforcement. Under such circumstances, the
coordination function of constitutions is anemic at best. Leaders
that anticipate citizen apathy become more likely to transgress
constitutional terms.38
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39. See Feldman, supra note 8, at 887.
40. See Paul D. Carrington, Could and Should America Have Made an Ottoman Empire
in 1919?, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1071 (2008).
41. Id. at 1086-87.
42. See id.
43. See id. at 1086.
44. Id. at 1087 (citing WHITNEY T. PERKINS, CONSTRAINT OF EMPIRE: THE UNITED STATES
AND CARIBBEAN INTERVENTIONS 12-15 (1981)).
45. See id.
These effects are not wholly dependent upon an assumption of
citizen enforcement. Even constitutions that are primarily elite
bargains, in which coordination occurs among a small number of
players, may suffer from the fact that they rely on external enforce-
ment. When the enforcing authority departs, the internal players
face a new strategic environment in which violations of the bargain
face little apparent opposition.39 In short, occupation constitutions
would seem less likely to become self-enforcing.
These characteristics of occupation constitutions are evident in
Professor Carrington’s discussion of the United States’s intervention
in Cuba.40 After the Spanish-American War, the United States
occupied Cuba and proceeded to prepare the island for self-gover-
nance.41 In a misguided maneuver, the U.S. Senate adopted the
Platt Amendment to a military appropriations bill, embodying a
policy wherein the United States would intervene when and if
democratic institutions failed in an independent Cuba.42 This
provision was ultimately included in the 1902 Cuban Constitution.43
As Carrington so well describes, this “begot the disorders that it had
been intended to prevent.”44 Domestic factions refused to compro-
mise and each sought to induce the United States to intervene on
their own side, preventing a stable, self-enforcing democracy from
taking hold.45
In summary, the circumstances of their birth mean that occupa-
tion constitutions are likely to lack essential features for long-run
endurance and effectiveness. The more that constitutions seek to
transform earlier understandings and unwritten norms without
domestic involvement, it seems, the less likely they are to generate
strong local legitimacy and enforceability.
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46. See, e.g., 5 MAX SAVELLE, EMPIRES TO NATIONS: EXPANSION IN AMERICA: 1713-1824, at
24 (1974) (describing how European colonizing states tended to extend and reproduce their
own political institutions in the American colonies).
47. See U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4.
48. See generally Ruth Gordon, Saving Failed States: Sometimes a Neocolonialist Notion,
12 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y  903, 907 n.15 (1993) (“During the Nineteenth Century ... [t]he
‘Civilized’ Nations of Europe and the United States had the right to control their own
destinies free of foreign intrusion. The less civilized Asian and Latin American states,
however, were fair targets of intervention.”).
49. Hague Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land art. 42, Oct. 18,
1907, 36 Stat. 2277.
50. Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1950).
A. Identifying Occupation Constitutions
This Section examines the incidence of occupation constitutions.
The phenomenon is a relatively new one. The strategy of occupation
and political reconstruction contrasts with the traditional approach
of conquering powers: to amalgamate the territory of the conquered
into the territory of the conqueror or to take it as a colony.46 It is
only in 1945 that taking territory by force became illegal in
international law.47 Thus, there are relatively few cases of occupa-
tion before the twentieth century, and virtually all of them involve
American intervention in Latin America.48
The legal definition of an occupation in international law is
remarkably simple. The Hague Conventions provide that a
“[t]erritory is considered occupied when it is actually placed under
the authority of the hostile army. The occupation extends only to the
territory where such authority has been established and can be
exercised.”49 War is not a necessary condition of occupation per se:
even a civil conflict can give rise to occupation if it prompts a foreign
force to invade. The Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, Part II,
Section D.3 of which focuses largely on “Occupied Territory,”
emphasizes de facto control of a territory: “the occupying power
must be in a position to substitute its own authority for that of the
occupied authorities, which must have been rendered incapable of
functioning publicly.” The relatively generous definition is moti-
vated by the general concern in the Fourth Geneva Convention for
the protection of civilians in occupied territory.50 Occupation
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51. Note that occupations conducted before the establishment of the United Nations
system are not governed by today’s law of belligerent occupation. Japan and Germany were
occupied under the legal principle of debellatio, which considers the right of conquest that no
longer exists. See André Nollkaemper, Concurrence Between Individual Responsibility and
State Responsibility in International Law, 52 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 615, 625-26 (2003). Today’s
law emphasizes the duty to preserve the institutions in the occupied territory, and many
believe that the United States occupation of Iraq violated these provisions. See, e.g., Marco
Sassòli, Legislation and Maintenance of Public Order and Civil Life by Occupying Powers, 16
EUR. J. INT’L L. 661 (2005); see also Eyal Benvenisti, The Security Council and the Law on
Occupation: Resolution 1483 on Iraq in Historical Perspective, 1 ISR. DEF. FORCES L. REV. 19
(2003); Philipp Dann & Zaid Al-Ali, The Internationalized Pouvoir Constituant— Constitution-
Making Under External Influence in Iraq, Sudan and East Timor, 10 MAX PLANCK Y.B. U.N.
L. 423, 453 (2006) (contending that the drafting of Iraqi Transitional Administrative Law
violated international law); Brett H. McGurk, A Lawyer in Baghdad, 8 GREEN BAG 51, 55
(2004).
52. See generally JOHN HUXTABLE ELLIOTT, EMPIRES OF THE ATLANTIC WORLD: BRITAIN
AND SPAIN IN AMERICA 1492-1830 (2006) (describing the relationships between imperial
defense, physical and symbolic occupation, societal changes, emerging elites, and war).
53. See generally Yahia H. Zoubir, The Western Sahara Conflict: A Case Study in Failure
imposes responsibilities for such protection and duties to refrain
from making fundamental changes in the governance or boundaries
of the occupied territory.51
We distinguish occupation from colonization, at least for the
purposes of this Essay.52 The two phenomena clearly share many of
the same characteristics, and it is undeniably relevant to our
endeavor to ponder the character and fate of constitutions that
emerge out of colonial situations. Both phenomena—to the extent
we are concerned with ultimately independent states—assume a
situation of subjugated authority followed by emergent sovereignty.
Occupations, however, differ from colonialism with respect to the
target state’s status prior to contact with the outside power.
Occupations, at least as we define them, presume that the target
state is fully constituted as a state and independent prior to
intervention. This difference, as we describe below, is critical to
understanding whether the occupation has diverted a state’s
institutional path.
“Occupations” come in many flavors, some of which we exclude
from our definition and, thus, our analysis. A number of actions
involve the control of territory that had not been—and has yet to
be—fully constituted as an independent state. For example, Morocco
has controlled the territory of Western Sahara since Spain withdrew
in 1975.53 The Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic has contested
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of Prenegotiation and Prolongation of Conflict, 26 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 173, 175-83 (1996).
54. See Stephen Zunes, The Future of Western Sahara, FOREIGN POL’Y IN FOCUS, July 20,
2007, http://www.fpif.org/fpiftxt/4410.
55. See Institute for Middle East Understanding, 3.10 - How Many Countries Recognize
Palestine as a State?, http://imeu.net/news/article0065.shtml (last visited Feb. 28, 2007).
56. See generally CLAIRE PALLEY, AN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS DEBACLE: THE U.N.
SECRETARY-GENERAL’S MISSION OF GOOD OFFICES IN CYPRUS: 1999-2004 (2005).
57. Indeed, international influence is probably a continuous variable, ranging from total
imposition to more moderate influence. In the case of the Sudan, for example, the
international community was extensively involved in a peace negotiation that served as the
predicate for the constitutional bargain, in which the international community had little
direct involvement. Dann & Al-Ali, supra note 51, at 457. Dann and Al-Ali also argue for
distinguishing multilateral from national occupations. Id. at 456.
58. See EŞREF AKSU, THE UNITED NATIONS, INTRA-STATE PEACEKEEPING AND NORMATIVE
CHANGE 197-201 (2003) (discussing UNTAC deployment).
59. RICHARD CAPLAN, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE OF WAR-TORN TERRITORIES: RULE AND
RECONSTRUCTION 19-20 (2005) (discussing the implementation of UNTAET).
these claims and is recognized by more than seventy-five govern-
ments as well as the African Union.54 However we judge its current
sovereignty, it was not an independent country before the occupa-
tion and so is not included in our sample. Israeli military control of
the West Bank and Gaza continues despite the international
recognition of a non-state Palestinian Authority55 but is excluded
under the same criteria. We also exclude cases in which the
occupation does not cover the entire territory of the independent
state. For example, Northern Cyprus, controlled by Turkey, is
denounced as a case of occupation by Greek Cypriots,56 but only
constitutes a partial occupation and so we exclude it. 
There are also a significant number of occupations that have been
undertaken under authority of the United Nations.57 We might
think of this as the maximum extension of a peacekeeping mission,
in which the international community takes over core governmental
functions on a transitional basis. These actions meet our basic
definition of occupation but are not included here because of their
multilateral character. Examples include the United Nations
Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), which governed that
country from 1992 to 1993,58 and the United Nations Transitional
Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), which ran that country
from 1999-2002.59 Some cases are excluded on multiple grounds. The
United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK)
and United Nations Transitional Authority in Eastern Slavonia,
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60. See, e.g., id. at 18-19.
61. E.g., TED GALEN CARPENTER, NATO’S EMPTY VICTORY: A POSTMORTEM ON THE BALKAN
WAR (2000) (analyzing the prospect of partitioning Kosovo from Serbia).
62. Meredith Reid Sarkees, The Correlates of War Data on War: An Update to 1997, 18
CONFLICT MGMT. & PEACE SCI. 123 (2000).
63. We are confident that all the occupations identified are correctly scored. We may,
however, have overlooked some cases of occupation. There are some occupations that arise
from peacekeeping missions, and because of our focus on interstate disputes, these do not
necessarily enter our sample. Moreover, Version 3.0 of the COW MID data provides
information about disputes from 1816-1997. Id. We added cases outside these dates of which
we are aware (Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2004), but we likely missed some occupations
prior to 1816 and after 1997.
64. See Kristian S. Gleditsch & Michael D. Ward, A Revised List of Independent States
Since the Congress of Vienna, 25 INT’L INTERACTIONS 393 (1999), updated at http://
privatewww.essex.ac.uk/nksg/data-4.html. Ward and Gleditsch identify the existence of states
from 1816-2006. For the years between 1789 and 1816, we use data about the birth of states
from the Issue Correlates of War Project (ICOW). See Paul R. Hensel, Issue Correlates of War
Project Data Archive: Colonial History, http://garnet.acns.fsu.edu/~phensel/icow.html#colonies
(last visited Feb. 22, 2008). For years after 2002, we extended Ward and Gleditsch’s colonies
codings three years (the only change being a merger between Serbia and Montenegro). See
Baranja, and Western Sirmium (UNTAES) were similar operations
but did not involve occupation of an entire country.60 Kosovo may
one day become an independent state, but it was not one prior to
U.N. occupation.61
An historical record of occupations, at least as we define them, is
not available. In practical terms, because an occupation follows, or
sometimes constitutes, an inter-state dispute, we base our census on
the universe of such disputes. Using the Correlates of War (COW)
project’s data on militarized interstate disputes (MID),62 we then
identify the set of possible occupations as those disputes in which
the highest action in the dispute is coded as “occupation or higher,”
leaving approximately 1600 disputes with possible occupations.  We
then read case-level material on each of these disputes to determine
whether an occupation occurred surrounding that dispute. For those
actions meeting our definition, we recorded the names of the
occupiers as well as the start and end dates of the occupation. We
find a total of 107 occupations occurring in 59 host countries.63
In order to match periods of occupation with constitutional
development, we need an accounting of the constitutional chronol-
ogy of states. As part of our larger project, we have collected data on
the constitutional history of every independent state—as identified
by Ward and Gleditsch—from 1789 to 2005.64 For each country, we
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H. Flanz et al. eds., 2007) (providing invaluable background information for most countries);
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georgetown.edu (last visited Feb. 22, 2008). 
66. Although we are confident that we have identified nearly all “new” constitutions in
the world, it is quite possible that we have overlooked a fair number of amendments,
especially older ones, simply because they are documented to a lesser degree.
67. See Table 1 infra.
record the promulgation year of “new,” “interim,” or “reinstated”
constitutions and the year of any amendments. Reconstructing
constitutional chronologies for all independent states is not a simple
matter and we rely upon a collection of cross-national, regional, and
country-level sources in order to compile the data.65 We count a total
of 801 new, 90 interim, and 57 reinstated constitutions.66
We identify occupation constitutions by comparing the constitu-
tional chronologies for each country to the occupation periods. We
call occupation constitutions those written during the occupation
period as well as those written within three years following the end
of an occupation, to account for the possibility that the occupier’s
influence extends past the period of occupation. 
Certainly, there is some question as to whether those constitu-
tions enacted subsequent to the occupation should be included. In
part, we treat the issue as an empirical question, with the expecta-
tion that the similarity of these documents to those of the occupier
will tell us much about the effect of the occupation. Of the 107
occupations, 42 result in new constitutions by our accounting. Table
1 lists the 42 occupation constitutions, of which 30 were drafted
during the occupation and 12 within three years after the end of the
occupation.67 The table identifies both the occupied country and the
primary occupying state. In most cases, only one country acted as
occupier, but in others there were as many as eleven occupiers. For
the cases with multiple occupiers, we identified the primary
occupying state based on historical accounts of the occupation.
2008] CONSTITUTION MAKING IN OCCUPIED STATES 1153
68. Thirty-three percent of Russian occupations resulted in at least one constitution, with
many resulting in multiple constitutions, whereas 28 percent of the United States’s
occupations and 22 percent of France’s occupations resulted in at least one constitution. These
percentages do not seem very high considering these countries are responsible for the largest
number of occupation constitutions. On the other hand, 100 percent of Vietnam’s occupations
resulted in at least one constitution. 
69. See Table 1 infra.
70. Id.
71. But see POLITICAL CULTURE AND CONSTITUTIONALISM, supra note 8, at 2-3 (arguing
that the nature of occupying power, as an authoritarian or democratic regime, determines
whether occupation is imperialistic or benign).
III. CHARACTERISTICS OF OCCUPATION CONSTITUTIONS
A. To State-build or Not?
Not every military occupation leads to a new constitution. Indeed,
occupation constitutions seem to be associated with certain
occupying powers who are evidently partial to constitution making
as a strategy. The three leading occupiers in our sample, by total
number of constitutions drafted during or immediately following
occupation, are Russia (fourteen), the United States (nine), and
France (eight).68 All three shared at least a formal ideological
commitment to self-determination as a value, though of course no
superpower wants client states to have functional independence on
certain questions. This was especially true during the Cold War. A
majority of the occupation constitutions were written during this
time period.69 The United States’s and Soviet Union’s desire to
advance their respective ideological agendas likely played a role in
the large number of occupations and occupation constitutions during
this period as well.70 Thus, occupation constitutions should be seen
as a particular strategy of particular states, rather than a global
phenomenon. They are not, moreover, limited to occupations
conducted by democratic regimes.71
B. State-building in Whose Image?
To what degree do occupying states shape the constitutions of
their host states? If one expects large-scale institutional transfer,
the data we present below suggest a reappraisal of 
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Constitutions 1 n.2 (Apr. 26, 2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors) (life
expectancy is calculated from a survival model of constitutions since 1789).
74. See RAY A. MOORE & DONALD L. ROBINSON, PARTNERS FOR DEMOCRACY: CRAFTING THE
NEW JAPANESE STATE UNDER MACARTHUR 51 (2002).
75. Id.
76. See generally Elkins, Ginsburg & Melton, supra note 73.
with, a majority of occupations do not result in new constitutions. Of
the 107 occupations in our data, only 26 resulted in at least one new
constitution being written—of course, several of these occupations
produced multiple new constitutions.72 Given that the life expec-
tancy of all constitutions is remarkably short (seventeen years),73 it
is mildly surprising that preexisting constitutions would survive the
occupation. Whether survival results from the occupying powers’
indifference to domestic politics or their deference to local interests
is unclear. In the case of Japan, MacArthur and the U.S. govern-
ment were insistent upon a new constitutional framework, a
demand that came as a bit of a surprise to the Japanese.74 Their
reading of the Potsdam Declaration suggested that they could get by
with better enforcement of the venerable Meiji Constitution, not its
revision and certainly not its replacement.75 On the other hand,
constitutional revision seemed to have the air of inevitability in the
Iraqi reconstruction. Transitions to democracy have come to be
marked by constitutional change, and it is hard to imagine a U.S.
occupying force after 9/11 celebrating a democratic transition
without a new slate of fundamental laws.
Constitutional replacement, then, is not an inevitable outcome of
occupation, but it seems more likely than it would be absent
intervention. Our analysis of the duration of constitutional systems
suggests that defeat in war (whether resulting in a new occupation
or not) increases the probability of a new constitution by about 50
percent.76 Moreover, the resulting set of constitutions (forty-two, by
our count), represent roughly 7 percent of the total number of new
constitutions, a significant subset worthy of investigation. 
When host states write a new constitution under occupation, do
they reproduce the political structure of the occupying power? Our
approach is to compare these occupation constitutio
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please see our Codebook (Jan. 31, 2007 draft), http://netfiles.uiuc.edu/zelkins/constitutions/
files/codebook.pdf.
79. The data collection protocol calls for cases to be coded by at least two independent
coders. For 279 of these cases we have reconciled any differences among coders. For the rest,
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constitution of the occupying country, as well as to other available
models. We do so by calculating similarities among constitutions
based on a subset of variables from the Comparative Constitutions
Project (CCP) dataset.77 We begin with a set of 92 variables having
to do with the provision of various political, civil, social, and
economic rights.78 For the most part, these are binary variables
measuring the presence or not of a certain right. For several survey
questions that allow for more qualified responses, we have collapsed
the responses such that provision under any circumstance consti-
tutes provision of that right. So, for example, constitutions that
prohibit capital punishment under any condition are equivalent to
those that prohibit it except in the case of war. 
One could measure similarity across a wider set of variables. The
CCP dataset includes over 600 questions and thus will allow for a
fairly comprehensive omnibus test of similarity with respect to the
content of constitutions. Nevertheless, given the near universality
of rights provisions in constitutional design, we reason that these
variables make for a fairly tractable, if not entirely representative,
sample of constitutional provisions. Also, our estimates are, by
necessity, based on a less than full sample of constitutions because
our data collection is still in progress. Nonetheless, our sample is
substantial, including approximately two-thirds of history’s 654
“new” constitutions, as well as a set of amended constitutions from
this set.79 
We generate similarities between cases across the 92 binary
variables using Pearson’s Phi, one of several possible measures of
similarity that are appropriate when the elements in the compari-
son set are binary variables. Given a cross-tabulation of matches
between two constitutions in which a and d represent the cells in
the diagonal of agreement, and b and c represent the cells in the
diagonal of disagreement, Pearson’s Phi is calculated as:
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81. See Table 1 infra; Figure 1 infra.
82. The Twenty-Seventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution was ratified in 1992, more
than 202 years after its initial submission in 1789. See Elai Katz, On Amending Constitutions:
The Legality and Legitimacy of Constitutional Entrenchment, 29 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS.
251, 260 n.33 (1996).
83. See generally TAKII KAZUHIRO, THE MEIJI CONSTITUTION: THE JAPANESE EXPERIENCE
OF THE WEST AND THE SHAPING OF THE MODERN STATE (2007) (describing the intellectual
and ranges from -1 to 1, where 1 = perfect agreement and -1 =
perfect disagreement. When we calculate this quantity for each
contemporaneous dyad among the 565 constitutions in our data, we
obtain a mean similarity score of -0.35 with a standard deviation of
0.15. We are able to calculate this quantity for 33 of the 42 occupa-
tion constitutions and that of their principal occupier. On average
the similarity between these 33 pairs is -0.28, suggesting that
occupation constitutions are moderately more similar to the
occupier’s constitution than they are to the average constitution in
force. It is useful, then, to take a closer look at several cases,
particularly the Japanese and Iraqi cases that motivate this paper.
With respect to the Japanese case, we can compare the
MacArthur-commissioned product80 to the 63 constitutions in our
sample that were in force in 1946. Using multidimensional scaling
to reduce the matrix of similarities to two-dimensional space, we
map the cases with respect to one another in Figure 1.81 Cases that
are positioned closer to one another are more similar across the set
of 92 rights. The dimensions themselves may have substantive
meaning, but at this point we are concerned mostly with their utility
in displaying distances among constitutions. The United States’s
case is the current constitution as of 1992,82 but of course is
substantially similar to the constitution in place during the
Japanese deliberations. 
Strikingly, of the 63 constitutional models in force in or prior to
1946, the Japanese constitution of that year is most similar to its
predecessor, the 1889 Meiji constitution.83 On the other hand, signs
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85. See Deborah M. Weissman, The Human Rights Dilemma: Rethinking the
Humanitarian Project, 35 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 259, 336 (2004) (“Indeed, immediately
upon the approval of an interim Iraqi Constitution which was drafted by a non-elected body
appointed by U.S. administrators, a significant segment of the Iraqi population denounced the
document and ‘dismissed it as the work of the United States and its ... allies.’” (citation
omitted)).
86. See Figure 3 infra.
87. See, e.g., Feldman, supra note 8, at 858-59.
88. See supra notes 19-38 and accompanying text.
of U.S. authorship are evident as well. Of the 63 constitutions in
force, the U.S. Constitution ranks sixth in similarity to the Japa-
nese document.84 Together these data suggest the persistence of a
local constitutional tradition together with a heavy dose of guest-
writing.  
Turning to the Iraqi 2005 Constitution, we again see what
appears to be a rather local affair, but this time with no evidence of
the occupier’s input, as is suggested by the data in Figure 2. In that
case, the U.S. document (at least the rights component) bears
almost no resemblance to the Iraqi Constitution.85 Of the 191
constitutions in force, the U.S. Constitution ranks 176th in terms of
similarity to the Iraqi Constitution, with a measure of similarity of
-0.49.86 The constitutions most similar to the Iraqi Constitution are
all relatively recent documents from the developing world, with
fourteen of the top twenty in Africa, the Middle East, and Central
Asia. In short, the Japanese Constituton reflected imposed norms,
but also a good deal of congruence with the preexisting understand-
ings of the scope of the predecessor Meiji document. The Iraqi
document seems to bear little resemblance to the U.S. Constitution,
in contrast with popular views of the document as imposed from
outside.87
C. Duration of Occupation Constitutions
For reasons we outline above, occupation constitutions would
seem less likely to be self-enforcing and, therefore, less likely to
endure as long as those written under other circumstances.88 In fact,
most of these constitutions die before or very near the end of the
occupation period, but there are a few that appear to become self-
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be useful in generating more precise estimates of the lifespan of occupation constitutions. See
Elkins, Ginsburg & Melton, supra note 73. The general patterns evident in the bivariate data,
however, do not change substantially. 
enforcing, in the sense of lasting well beyond the end of the
occupation period. 
We report two measures of the duration of occupation constitu-
tions in Table 1.89 We define the lifespan of a constitution as the
period of time between its entry into force and either its suspension
or its formal replacement by another constitution. The lifespan
column in Table 1 is simply the number of years the constitution
was in force. Because occupations can persist for years (and, thus,
provide external enforcement for the constitution), it is important
to take occupation length into account. We also report, therefore, the
post-occupation lifespan: the number of years the constitution
persisted after the end of occupation. The post-occupation lifespan
is irrelevant for those constitutions that do not survive the occupa-
tion and is redundant  for constitutions written after the end of the
occupation period. 
As expected, life expectancy of imposed constitutions is substan-
tially less than that of other constitutions. The life expectancy of
occupation constitutions is about thirteen years, while the life
expectancy for all constitutions is about seventeen years.90 More
importantly, of the few constitutions that last past the end of the
occupation period, half are replaced within two years. This finding
lends credence to our expectation about the fragility of constitutions
once the occupier is no longer present to enforce them.
IV. TOKYO AND BAGHDAD
The preceding discussion leads us to revisit the two prominent
cases that motivate our inquiry. In light of the short duration of
occupation constitutions in general, the Japanese case is all the
more remarkable. Our framework may also provide insights into
what seem to be dim prospects for the Iraqi case.
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role in the occupation generally, see JOHN DOWER, EMBRACING DEFEAT: JAPAN IN THE WAKE
OF WORLD WAR II (1999); Yoshiro Miwa & J. Mark Ramseyer, The Good Occupation (Harvard
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94. Id. at 177-80 (discussing sovereignty and kokutai).
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A. Japan
1. Drafting the Constitution
The Japanese constitution would seem to be a paradigmatic case
of imposition, as the document was largely drafted by the occupation
authorities in February 1946.91 But the facts are more complex, and
recent scholarship has emphasized the collaborative nature of the
enterprise.92 
The first issue to be faced in Tokyo was whether constitutional
reform was needed at all. From the Allied point of view, constitu-
tional reform was necessary in order to accomplish the democratiza-
tion of Japan.93 Because pre-war Japan had rested its legitimacy on
the concept of the kokutai, or national polity with the emperor as
sovereign, a “constitutional moment” would be needed to reorder the
polity.94
Despite relatively extensive planning for the occupation during
the War, constitutional reform did not seem to be a major element
of the American policy in the first months of the occupation. The
Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP) initially seemed
agnostic regarding the scope of constitutional revision.95 It was not
until October 1945 that MacArthur told the new Prime Minister,
Baron Shidehara, that he needed to undertake full constitutional
reform (though he had suggested the same to Prince, and Prime
Minister, Higashikuni Naruhiko as well as his Deputy Prime
Minister Konoe Fumimaro the previous month).96 Revision was
initially conceived as an internal Japanese matter, without much
guidance from Americans other than the Potsdam Declaration
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102. See id. at 94.
103. Id.
104. See id. at 87-88, 117.
105. See id. at 108-09.
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formula that governance would reflect the “freely expressed will of
the Japanese people.”97
The Japanese government began the drafting process under the
direction of Joji Matsumoto, a commercial law professor with close
ties to the zaibatsu industrial conglomerates that had dominated
the pre-war economy.98 He produced a draft which was a minor
revision of the Meiji Constitution, with the emperor retaining
sovereignty.99 When this draft was leaked to the press in very early
February 1946, an outcry ensued in the press and SCAP seized the
opportunity to take over the process.100 General Courtney Whitney,
in charge of civilian affairs for the occupation, convened a group
within SCAP and gave them one week to complete a draft, in
accordance with MacArthur’s brief outline of instructions that
required the people to be sovereign with the emperor as head of
state.101 MacArthur’s instructions also included an outline of the
famous peace clause that became Article 9, and noted that there
would be no titles or nobility allowed.102
The schedule was extremely tight, in part because the Allied
Powers in the Far Eastern Commission (FEC) believed that they
had jurisdiction over the process under the Potsdam Declaration.103
The Allies were aggressive about holding the emperor personally
responsible for the war, and MacArthur continuously sought to
control events rather than submit to direction from the FEC.104
One week later, in a remarkable meeting with the Japanese
government, Whitney rejected the Matsumoto draft and presented
the SCAP document in English as the basis for discussion.105 The
shocked Japanese soon learned that the document was more than
a basis, but rather was to form the core of the new constitution from
which any deviation would have to be justified.106
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Moore and Robinson, in their recent magisterial study, use the
term “conspiracy” to describe the production of the final Japanese
document.107 In large part, this approach was necessitated by the
need for secrecy with regard to the authorship of the draft. From the
American side, MacArthur needed the Japanese government to
represent that the draft was their own, not only to make it legiti-
mate locally but to convince the other Allied governments, who were
calling for Hirohito’s head, that the matter was out of MacArthur’s
control.108 The Japanese, reluctant to cede all autonomy or at least
to appear to do so, had an interest in de-emphasizing SCAP
involvement as well.109 Thus the two sides had a common interest in
secrecy.110 
When Matsumoto translated the SCAP draft into Japanese, he
made substantial changes in the interests of “style.”111 This was
necessary partly because of the American use of terms that sounded
quite foreign, such as the requirement of cabinet “advice and
consent” for imperial action.112 General Whitney insisted that the
section on rights refer to the “age-old struggle of man to be free” and
Matsumoto unsuccessfully tried to delete this.113 But Matsumoto’s
subterfuge also included deleting the preamble and the Diet’s role
in passing the Imperial Household Law, the primary statute
empowering and regulating the emperor.114 Rights were granted
only to kokumin, Japanese nationals, rather than all citizens or
persons.115 In this sense, the inevitable challenges of translation
mattered for the substantive outcomes of the occupation constitu-
tion.
More importantly, the translation into colloquial Japanese
represented a significant change. The Meiji Constitution had been
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written in archaic, legalistic Japanese, scarcely more intelligible
than the highly formal language of the Imperial Household.116 By
translating the document into colloquial Japanese (notwithstanding
the wooden language of certain phrases drafted in English), the
process facilitated self-enforcement, because of the clarity of the
strictures. Furthermore, to the extent that the Meiji Constitution’s
rights provisions had been known, the fact that the new constitution
apparently retained a similar though expanded set of rights may
have meant that it was consistent with understandings of the
proper scope of a constitution.117 
The process of adopting the new constitution followed the revision
requirements of the Meiji Constitution, proceeding by an imperial
rescript followed by a two-thirds vote in both houses.118 This
required deliberation in the Privy Council first, but, perhaps
because of the Emperor’s own sense that the document would allow
the imperial institution to survive, few changes were made.119 The
parliamentary approval required new elections,120 inevitable anyway
after an Allied purge of prewar politicians.121 Though the election
was characterized by the Allies as a referendum of sorts on the
constitution,122 few politicians seemed to discuss the document in
the campaign.123 Nevertheless, the summer debates in the newly
constituted House of Representatives were vigorous and led to a
number of minor changes in the draft.124 The remarkable debate
proceeded through the efforts of Tokujiro Kanamori, Minister of
State for the Constitution, who explained the draft to the legislators
and effectively maintained the fiction that the draft was Japanese
in origin.125 The constitution then went to the Emperor for signature
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and was promulgated on November 3, 1946, taking effect six months
thereafter.126
The story, then, is one of collusion more than imposition. One
should recall that there were significant forces within Japan which
were supportive of liberal ideals.127 The Meiji period had seen an
outpouring of liberal sentiment;128 indeed the Meiji Constitution was
widely viewed as a reactionary document to maintain the preroga-
tives of the statist system that was developing, a rearguard action
to stop liberalism in its tracks.129 The liberal forces were strong
enough to be able to initiate the Taisho democracy period some
three decades later, a brief period in the 1920s when democracy
flourished.130
The MacArthur process contains a few extraordinary moments of
negotiation and what might be called effective resistance on the part
of the Japanese interlocutors. One famous example concerns the
“red article” (article 38 in the SCAP draft), in which the New Deal-
oriented American drafters provided that all land in Japan should
belong ultimately to the state.131 This no doubt struck the Japanese
government figures who saw the draft as godless communism, and
they rejected the clause.132 The Japanese also successfully argued
for a bicameral rather than a unicameral parliament.133 The
bicameral idea originated in a civilian Constitution Study Group,
which had been influential on several key members of SCAP.134
These two examples show that, far from attempting to impose
American institutions on Japan, the SCAP authorities viewed the
Japanese restructuring as an opportunity to assemble a set of
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proven democratic institutions, whether American or not. They
sought to retain a unicameral parliamentary system, rather than
impose a bicameral presidential one like that of the United
States.135 It was the Japanese, not the Americans, who sought to
bring the draft into greater conformity with American constitutional
structures, at least as far as property rights and the bicameral
parliament.136
Even the famous “peace clause” of Article 9137 may have had
Japanese origins. MacArthur asserted that Prime Minister
Shidehara suggested the inclusion of a peace clause in the constitu-
tion a few days before MacArthur drafted it in his brief note to the
drafting group,138 and Shidehara also claimed the idea was his
own.139 Mito traces the course of the drafting to show that, by the
time of the second Matsumoto draft, the issue of imperial command
of the army had already been taken off the table.140 Thus there were
internal forces on the Japanese side whose ideas, acquiescence, and
active collaboration were necessary to complete the remarkable
project of the 1946 Constitution.
2. A Self-enforcing Constitution
Once in place, Japan’s constitution has been incredibly resilient
and has become genuinely entrenched in the public imagination.141
It has been intensely contested but also remarkably stable—never
amended, occasionally adjudicated, and ultimately grounded in a set
of principles that the people understand and mostly accept.142 How
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has the constitution been so resilient? This Section argues that the
key factor is that Japan’s constitution has been largely self-enforc-
ing during the immediate post-war period. Importantly, the forces
keeping it in equilibrium are in flux today, and it is widely antici-
pated that the current governing coalition will indeed be able to
make changes in the next few years.143 The Japanese example thus
provides an excellent case study of how an imposed constitution can
become self-enforcing, as well as the conditions under which
constitutional change can occur.
The Japanese Constitution has been under attack from political
conservatives from the very beginning,144 and this intensified when
the true story of its origins emerged some years later.145 Domestic
revisionists sought for Japan to become a “normal country” with
armed forces.146 Since its formation in 1955,147 the Liberal Demo-
cratic Party (LDP) has sought to make changes but has never been
able to muster the two-thirds support in the Diet.148 In 1956, Japan
created a Commission on the Constitution to study revision,149 but
after several years of deliberations, it was unable to reach consensus
and its recommendations were never implemented.150 The constitu-
tion was also attacked from abroad.151 The Far Eastern Commission
(FEC) attacked it almost immediately as not having gone through
the process of FEC approval that they believed was required by the
Moscow Declaration.152 But despite promises, the Japanese govern-
ment never effected a formal revision.153
One clue as to why the constitution has been stable lies in the
Japanese debates over its adoption. In the debates in the Diet, two
issues stood out: the treatment of the emperor and the pacifism of
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Article 9.154 Substantial limitation on the role of the emperor was an
unconditional demand of the American occupiers, faced as they were
with the Allied powers demanding harsher treatment of the
emperor.155 The pacifism of Article 9, though of uncertain origin,
also constituted a major constraint on sovereignty and was thus
quite controversial.156
The bargain could be struck through gaiatsu (external pressure),
but it could only be maintained through naiatsu (internal pressure).
Here a key factor was that the Japanese were not in fact united on
the key issues. The left wanted Article 9 to prevent a return to
militarism.157 The right wing, on the other hand, was concerned with
the treatment of the emperor and the maintenance of his preroga-
tives.158 Japanese elites were thus split on the two key issues of the
postwar constitution. Had they united, they could certainly have
rejected the draft, with the likely outcome that the FEC would have
become involved and imposed a settlement on Japan.159 That
settlement might have included hanging the emperor as a war
criminal.160 One puzzle, then, is why the left did not seek to effect
this outcome. Perhaps they too were sufficiently concerned with
retaining a role for the emperor in some form, even a reduced one.
In any case, once adopted, postwar politics took over. After its
foundation in 1955, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) governed
Japan more or less continuously.161 The LDP has also been split
between revisionists, initially led by Hatoyama Ichiro and later
Kishi Nobusuke, and the pragmatic conservatives led initially by
Yoshida Shigeru, and later Ikeda Hayato, Sato Eisaku, and
Miyazawa Kiichi.162 The party system as a whole, however, was
fairly stable during the Cold War, with the Socialists consistently
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getting a fairly substantial minority of the vote.163 This meant that
the Socialists retained sufficient power to block the LDP from
engineering constitutional amendments to abolish or modify Article
9. Of course, the Socialists also lacked a majority to propose any
amendments to the economic system or to abolish the imperial
house entirely.164 They nevertheless were able to share in some
spoils of the system, and always were better off than they would be
in proposing a complete revision, which might lead to the replace-
ment of Article 9.165 Thus the constitution succeeded because it gave
the losers a stake in maintaining it. This is the key quality of self-
enforcing constitutions.
A critical juncture arose during the great protests surrounding
the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty in 1960.166 The Japanese govern-
ment at the time was led by the revisionist Kishi Nobosuke, who
sought to revise the Security Treaty to give Japan a larger role in its
own defense.167 Faced with opposition among Diet members who saw
a threat to Article 9, Kishi “ramm[ed] through” the Treaty in a
secret session when the opposition was absent.168 This led to
massive political protests, with thousands of citizens taking to the
streets.169 Kishi eventually resigned, and was replaced with the
pragmatist Ikeda.170 The incident illustrates an executive threat to
transgress the constitutional order that provoked enforcement by
the public. The public was able to overcome its collective action
problem and effectively enforce the constitution. Though the
Security Treaty survived, effectuating a de facto reinterpretation of
Article 9, Kishi was punished for his procedural violation.171 One can
imagine an alternative ending to this story in which the constitution
was overturned, either by leftist protest, rightist reaction, or Kishi’s
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routinization of the practice of calling secret sessions. The constitu-
tion survived, however, and Japan entered the high-growth era of
the 1960s.172
The Cold War is now over, and the Socialists all but dead as a
political force. Their last gasp was a brief period in government
in the mid-1990s, in which they performed so poorly that they
ensured their demise as a political faction.173 At the same time,
intra-factional politics within the LDP shifted power toward the
constitutional revisionists associated with Yasuhiro Nakasone,
Shintaro Abe, and others.174 This group consolidated its position
with the popular Koizumi prime ministership;175 Koizumi estab-
lished a new politics based more on public relations than on the
traditional pork barrel.176
These changes had severe consequences for the self-enforcing
nature of the constitution. As the party system recalibrated after an
electoral reform, a new opposition Democratic Party emerged, made
up in part of former LDP hawks who had left the party.177 When the
LDP proposed constitutional reform again in the mid-1990s, the
DPJ and other small parties did not oppose it but scrambled to come
up with proposals of their own.178 The self-enforcing equilibrium has
fallen apart, and reform of the key bargain seems likely to occur in
some form in the next few years. The consensus view is that the
bulk of the 1946 document will remain intact, and crucial features
like the rights provisions will not be threatened.179 Japan will
remain a constitutional democracy. But the point is that the
particular constitutional equilibrium will have shifted, and Japan
will enter a (post-) post-occupation era.
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B. Baghdad
Like pre-war Japan, Saddam’s Iraq seemed to pose a challenge
from the periphery of modernity to the established interstate
system. Many believed Iraq in the 1970s would become the first
Middle Eastern industrialized nation.180 It had key ingredients
including being formally secular, endowed with a literate, well-
educated population, and being rich in oil and gas (a feature which
has subsequently come to be seen as a hindrance to moderniza-
tion).181 Like pre-war Japan, Iraq then entered a period of misgov-
ernment, taking a suicidal international course that provoked
confrontation with, and ultimately defeat by, the United States.182
Despite these similarities, the circumstances giving rise to
democratic transition each seem to reverberate with particularity.
Japan in 1945 was a defeated nation that had carried out a decade-
and-a-half militarist adventure with an emperor that was genuinely
revered as divine.183 Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, by contrast, was ruled
by a small group of his relatives and clansmen.184 Aside from his
Sunni followers, the majority of Iraqis were hardly willing to die for
Saddam and his ilk.185 When Emperor Hirohito renounced his
divinity, there was an enormous ideological vacuum.186 In contrast,
when Saddam was removed from power, most Iraqis outside his
hometown of Tikrit were relieved and overjoyed.187 The only sadness
was found among the non-Iraqi pan-Arabists and some of the
journalists of Al-Jazeera, who appreciated his willingness to stand
up to the West.
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An ideological vacuum was important because it facilitated the
norms of liberal democracy. In the Iraqi case, there were already
primal ideologies and Islamic religious affiliations ready to fill the
void. Thus, ironically, Baathism’s failure has made Iraq more
difficult to reconstruct. A society with an established structure of
internalized norms, even anti-liberal ones, may prove easier to
reconstruct in a liberal vein if the previous regime is totally
defeated. Japan’s success in nation-building during the Meiji period
laid the groundwork for post-war constitutional order.189 In contrast,
Iraqi society with its latent tensions and centrifugal features now
appears to many to have required a good deal of government
oppression. This is a disturbing lesson of the last few years.
Another key variable that many would identify is the degree of
ethnic homogeneity. As Moore and Robinson note, “ethnic pluralism
does not facilitate constitutional foundings.”190 Although there are
important counterexamples, such as India, our work has found a
negative association between ethnic fractionalization and constitu-
tional duration.191 Japan is a famously homogenous nation,192 even
if that homogeneity has often been overstated.193 In part, this
perception of homogeneity is a result of the successful Meiji project
of modernization;194 had it gone differently, Japanese might identify
as members of their han, or regional origin, rather than as Japanese
kokutai. In other words, ethnicity should not be taken for granted
but is sometimes a product of constitutional arrangements. 
Elements of constitutional culture may also play a role. Japan’s
ability to engage in selective adaptation dates back before the Meiji
era, during the sakoku period when selective translations of Dutch
books made available through the Port of Dejima facilitated
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knowledge.195 Indeed, Keene notes that Japan in the Tokugawa
knew more about the Dutch through their selective study than any
other non-Western society.196 The Meiji project of “selective adapta-
tion” was widely seen as successful, and so invoking a new era of
borrowing made sense.197
The endowment in the Mideast, however, was quite different
indeed. The Arab cultural construct of occupation, spurred on by the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict, is one of resistance.198 This notion
ensured that the population would hardly be docile recipients of
Western knowledge. The construct of a society with its own moral
ordering meant that transfers were to be resisted, not celebrated.
Two other factors deserve mention. The first is oil. The well-
known phenomenon of the resource curse in political economy may
also apply to problems of constitutional reconstruction.199 Without
natural resources, or an army, Japan’s total defeat meant that it
was at the mercy of the victors. Iraq, on the other hand, had
resources.200 Even in the non-cooperative equilibrium of no constitu-
tional bargain, there would be some viable basis for an economy in
Iraq. At the same time, oil provided a high stakes issue to fight over.
The logic of the ultimate constitutional agreement, namely to
postpone the issue of oil allocation until a post-constitutional
election that the Shia were sure to win,201 hardly served to draw the
Sunni into a self-enforcing constitutional scheme.
Another key factor is internal to the process. The Japanese
process was carried out with great secrecy.202 This was necessitated
in part because both the Americans in SCAP and the Japanese had
an incentive to conceal the true extent of American involvement in
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the drafting. The Americans were trying to avoid input of the Far
Eastern Commission that sat in Washington, made up of hardliner
Allied powers that hardly shared MacArthur’s predisposition to
retain the emperor.203 Presenting the constitution as a product of
Japanese internal processes certainly served these interests. On the
Japanese side, the embarrassment the government would suffer had
it become clear that the draft was a foreign creation would have
been severe.204 Indeed, several times in the deliberation in the
House of Representatives, this issue came to a head.205 The “conspir-
acy” on the part of the occupying authorities and the Japanese
government allowed the process to go forward.
At the same time, there are a number of similarities between the
Japanese and Iraqi contexts. MacArthur’s hubris and imperial
orientation as the “American Caesar” matched that of any neo-
conservative, though his competence was evidently greater.206 This
meant that he characterized the Japanese problem as one of values
rather than of institutions. MacArthur thought that Christianity
was essential to the spiritual redemption of Japan, and this
viewpoint allowed defenders of the emperor to represent the
imperial institution as a potential ally in the Christianization of
Japan.207 This seems to have been an important step in MacArthur’s
momentous decision to save the emperor and allow him to retain his
throne as a constitutional monarch, against the demand of the FEC.
Beyond that, the element of social engineering on the part of the
occupiers is common to both instances. When the neo-conservatives
broke with conservative orthodoxy to propose a large scale “project”
of democratizing the Middle East, they evoked the earlier great era
of faith in technocracy and social engineering—the New Deal, and
before that Wilsonian idealism.208 It is an astounding irony that the
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political party built on principles of limited government in the
United States proceeded to draw inspiration from the New Deal
“project” of democratizing Japan.209
No two historical situations are identical, but this does not mean
that understanding history has no bearing on the present. Our view
is that the obvious lessons of the most successful occupation
constitution in history were ignored by those who believed it formed
a useful precedent for democratizing the Middle East. Ironically,
Japanese successes in nation-building before the occupation and in
locally enforcing the constitutional bargain thereafter made the
occupation constitution succeed.210 The key variables, then, lie not
with the well-intentioned constitutional planner, but within the
society that must live under the constitutional regime.
CONCLUSION
This Essay provides an initial examination of the phenomenon of
occupation constitutions. We find that not all occupations give rise
to new constitutions; instead, occupation constitutions seem to be
associated with a small number of superpowers. The expectation
that occupation constitutions are mere copies of those found in
the occupying countries does not appear to be supported by the
evidence.211 Certainly, successful occupation constitutions seem to
require both local adaptation and local enforcement in order to
endure.212 Of constitutions written under occupation, only a handful
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have survived an extended period after the withdrawal of the
occupier, and overall lifespans of occupation constitutions are
shorter than those of other constitutions.213 We attribute this to the
failure to establish self-enforcing institutions. Finally, in reviewing
the two most prominent cases of occupation constitutions, we find
that the Japanese case can be explained in part because of more
extensive local involvement than is usually recognized and because
of the self-enforcing structure of the bargain that was established.214
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Table 1  Occupation Constitutions
Occupied
Primary
Occupier
Constitution
Year*
Occupation 
End Year Lifespan
Post-Occu-
pation
 Lifespan
Occupa-
tion 
Length
Afghanistan Russia 1979 1989 1 - 10
Afghanistan Russia 1980 1989 5 - 10
Afghanistan Russia 1985 1989 2 - 10
Afghanistan Russia 1987 1989 3 1 10
Afghanistan Russia 1990 1989 2 2 10
Afghanistan
United
States 2001 2001 2 - 4
Afghanistan
United
States 2003 2001 2 - 4
Albania Italy 1939 1943 4 - 4
Albania Germany 1943 1944 3 2 1
Albania Germany 1946 1944 30 30 1
Austria Russia 1945 1955 10 - 10
Austria Russia 1955 1955 50 50 10
Bulgaria Russia 1947 1945 24 24 4
Cambodia Vietnam 1981 1989 8 - 11
Cambodia Vietnam 1989 1989 4 4 11
Chad Libya 1982 1981 7 7 1
Dominican
Republic
United
States 1924 1924 3 3 8
Egypt
United
Kingdom 1923 1922 7 7 4
France Germany 1946 1944 12 12 4
Haiti
United
States 1918 1934 14 - 19
Haiti
United
States 1932 1934 3 1 19
Haiti
United
States 1935 1934 11 11 19
Hungary Russia 1946 1956 3 - 11
Hungary Russia 1949 1989 40 - 33
Iraq
United
States 2004 2004 1 1 1
Iraq
United
States 2005 2004 1 1 1
Italy
Austria-
Hungary 1848 1848 13 12 1
Italy France 1943 1945 4 2 2
Italy France 1947 1945 58 58 2
Japan
United
States 1946 1952 59 53 7
1176 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:1139
Laos Vietnam 1991 1989 14 - 47
Mexico France 1865 1866 2 1 5
Mexico France 1867 1866 50 50 5
Paraguay Bolivia 1870 1876 70 64 7
Poland Russia 1947 1989 5 - 44
Poland Russia 1952 1989 40 3 44
Romania Russia 1944 1944 4 4 5
Syria France 1920 1944 10 - 24
Syria France 1930 1944 13 - 24
Turkey France 1920 1945 4 - 25
Turkey France 1924 1945 37 16 25
Yugoslavia Russia 1946 1945 7 7 4
* “Constitution year” denotes the year that the constitution was promul-
gated.
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Figure 1  Constitutional Proximities (c. 1946)
Universe: Constitutions in Force in 1946 (n = 63)
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Figure 2  Constitutional Proximities (c. 2005)
Universe: Constitutions in Force in 2005 (n = 191)
N.B. Cases shown are those whose similarity to Iraq is less than -0.45
and greater than -0.15—that is, those at either extreme.
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